Effect of PM Question Time on Government Decision Making

Effect of PM Question Time on Government Decision MakingAs Norton has noted, Parliament ceased to be a insurance indemnity-making legislature in the nineteenth century and is now a policy-influencing legislature. Parliament is thus expected to champaign policy to a process of scrutiny and influence.1 This essay will assess the extent to which the present tools available to parliament to call the governing to account can be said to experience a meaningful ability to effect judicatureal decision making. In order to evaluate the role of parliament in this matter, more or little of the procedural mechanisms of the home plate must be examined.Question Time in the House of Commons is one of the principal means by which information is obtained from ministers by Members of Parliament.2 Prior notice of the questions is given to ministers, however, supplementary questions may then be asked on matters arising out of the ministers reply, of which notice will not have been given. Quest ion Time is widely publicised and therefore has the effect of drawing public attention to matters of particular concern. The process can alike highlight the capabilities of psyche ministers as they will need to think on their feet in order to answer the supplementary questions. In April 1995 the then Health Secretary announced that some(prenominal) London hospitals were to be closed to curb public expenditure. The announcement of this unpalatable policy was made through a written answer rather than orally in the House. At Question Time the Health Secretary was accused of lacking moral courage3 and the episode gained considerable publicity.Question Time is the b atomic number 18ly regular occasion upon which the political science is obliged to account to Parliament for its management of the nations affairs.4 Other merits of the system are that it provides an probability for the opposition to select expirations as salutary as an opportunity for backbench MPs to question minist ers. This in turn allows for local and regional issues to be given hearing in encompassing parliamentary session. It also offers ministers the opportunity to become a contende of issues which might otherwise have gone unnoticed. Parliamentary questions are very useful in highlighting existing governmental policy and bringing any controversial issues surrounding it to the attention of the media and hence the public. This allows effective scrutiny of government. However, the process does not provide a direct mechanism for effecting governmental decision making, although indirectly, the resulting public pressure may provide a mechanism for influencing policy change. Further limitations are that it operates on a rota system, with departments being subject to questions only once per 3 or 4 weeks time restraints make in depth questioning impossible and, sensitive questions can be avoided.5 Moreover, government backbenchers are able to reduce the time available for opposition questions by presenting favourable questions to ministers.Each Wednesday the House of Commons hosts Prime Ministers Questions which lasts rough 30 minutes. This procedure allows the Leader of the Opposition to put up to three questions to the Prime Minister. This presents an opportunity for immediate argument amidst the parties and can affect MPs perceptions of their leaders.6 Other MPs are then able to ask questions of the Prime Minister. As above, this allows for raising public awareness of issues and for questioning government policy. However, exchangeable problems also exist, with the use of government backbenchers to praise government action rather than question it. This process has lead Loveland to concludeThat MPs and ministers feel it appropriate to run off the Commons evidently limited and supposedly valuable time on such nonsense is in itself regrettable. That such questions are also manifestly an irritate to the intelligence of voters provides further justification for the conte ntion that the House of Commons is a quite inadequate vehicle for the sensible representation of political opinion in a modern democratic society.7Another way in which parliament may effect governmental decision making is via flip. There are some(prenominal) types of debate which happen in the House of Commons. Debate will occur after the second reading of legislation, yet there are other eatable as well. Emergency debates may exceptionally occur where a matter is deemed to be of urgent national importance. There are also daily dissipation debates, where backbenchers can initiate short debate on matters for their choosing. Selection is by ballot through the Speakers Office. Members may also express concerns some issues by tabling a written motion requesting debate at an early day. However, such early day motions rarely result in debate and instead are primarily confined to shoeing the strength of parliamentary feeling on particular issues.8 Where pressure grows significantly th e government may feel prepared to respond but again the influence is a great deal indirect.Carroll provides an rating of debate as a whole.9 He states that the merits of debates are that they force ministers to explain and justify policy initiatives to the House they provide an opportunity for the opposition to expose flaws in government policy and decisions and present suggestions they help to educate public opinion they provide an opportunity for government ministers to display dissent, enabling policy changes to be considered and, they give MPs the opportunity to present the views of constituents and interest groups. However, the demerits of debate according to Carroll are high in number in the main it is the government, rather than parliament, which decides what will be debated and when (there are twenty Opposition Days when the Opposition chooses the subject for debate) most debates are dominate by the frontbenches there is not time to engage in full detailed debate or to d ebate crises as and when they arise they are often poorly attended they attract little public attention. Furthermore, Carroll alleges that policy is formed and decisions made before parliamentary debate takes place. The government therefore defends its decisions during debate no matter of any merits of alternative proposals or exposed defects in its decisions and therefore debates appear to have very little immediate effect in terms of influencing government thinking or action.10Perhaps the most effective scrutiny of government is through select committees.11 These committees are chaired by senior backbenchers and consist of between 9 and 13 backbench members. They allow in depth analysis of departmental action and investigate a wide range of topics.12 Examples of issues investigated by select committees embroil the Westland Affair13, although the government refused to allow witnesses from the Department of Trade and Industry to give evidence and the Arms to Iraq controversy, whe re the Select Committee on Trade and Industry examined the barter of equipment to Iraq during the first Gulf conflict. Media interest may also influence the topics investigated by select committees, as evidenced by the examination of the decision to go to war in Iraq by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in 2003.14Select committees are empowered to send for persons, papers and records and can expect full government co-operation. Furthermore, persons giving evidence must take a formal oath. However, as illustrated above, the co-operation of government, although expected, is not always assured.Once a select committee has investigated an issue it will publish a report. Around one third of these reports result in debate in the House, which are subject to the analysis above. Carroll has provided further evaluation of the merits and demerits of select committees,15 stating in support that they provide a systematic infrastructure for detailed scrutiny of government conduct they are the only parliamentary forum in which ministers and public servants may be questioned in depth on topics not determined by party leaders there is a less party-political atmosphere the members gain expertise in a particular area the reports attract media attention. However, the demerits include they cannot impose any sanctions or direct pressures on government if dissatisfied with departments conduct as noted, few reports result in debate the government can dictate when persons will not give evidence they are poorly supported in terms of resources facilities and research staff.From the analysis above it may be seen that although Parliament has several option open in terms of scrutinising government action, these procedures offer little in terms of direct effect of government decision and policy making. The Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons has produced a report which suggests reforms to make better use of non-legislative time and strengthen the role of the backbe nch MPs.16 So far this has resulted in minimal reforms such as a reservation of time for Topical Questions in departmental question time and a consideration of ways in which opportunities to debate the plans of government departments may be guaranteed.17 However, without further reform, Parliament is currently unable to influence government decision making in any significant per-event sense.BibliographyAllen, M. and Thompson, B., Cases and Materials on Constitutional and administrative Law, 9th rendering (2008), Oxford University PressBarnett, H., Constitutional and administrative Law, 6th Edition (2006), Routledge CavendishBogdanor, V., The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century, (2003), Oxford University PressBradley, A.W. and Ewing, K.D., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 1quaternary Edition (2007), PearsonCarroll, A., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th Edition (2007), Pearson EducationLord Hutton, The media reaction to the Hutton Report, (2006) PL 807Lovelan d, I., Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights A Critical Introduction, 4th Edition (2006), Oxford University PressNorton, P. (ed), Parliament in the 1980s, (1985), BlackwellPollard, D., Parpworth, N., and Hughes, D., Constitutional and Administrative Law Text with Materials, 4th Edition (2007), Oxford University Press1Footnotes1 Norton, P. (ed), Parliament in the 1980s, (1985), Blackwell, pg 82 Barnett, H., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 6th Edition (2006), Routledge Cavendish, pg 4053 cited in Loveland, I., Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights A Critical Introduction, 4th Edition (2006), Oxford University Press, pg 1574 Carroll, A., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th Edition (2007), Pearson Education, pg 1605 Carroll, supra pg 1616 Loveland, supra pg 1587 Loveland, supra pg 1598 Pollard, D., Parpworth, N., and Hughes, D., Constitutional and Administrative Law Text with Materials, 4th Edition (2007), Oxford University Press, pg 281 9 Carroll, supra pp 162-16410 Carroll, ibid note 911 Bogdanor, V., The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century, (2003), Oxford University Press, pg 17212 Bradley, A.W. and Ewing, K.D., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 14th Edition (2007), Pearson, pg 21913 Defence Committee, HC 518, 519 (1985-86), London HMSO Trade and Industry Committee, HC 176 (1986-87), London HMSO Treasury and polite Service Committee, HC 92 (1985-86), London HMSO14 Lord Hutton, The media reaction to the Hutton Report, (2006) PL 80715 Carroll, supra pp 168-17016 Allen, M. and Thompson, B., Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law, 9th Edition (2008), Oxford University Press, pg 32117 Allen and Thompson supra pp 321-322